@book {1591,
	title = {The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics},
	series = {The Jean Nicod Lectures},
	year = {1994},
	pages = {128},
	publisher = {MIT Press},
	organization = {MIT Press},
	edition = {1st Ed.},
	address = {Cambridge},
	abstract = {<p>The Elm and the Expert provides a lively discussion of semantic issues about mental representation, with special attention to issues raised by Frege{\textquoteright}s problem, twin cases, and the putative indeterminacy of reference. The book extends and revises a view of the relation between mind and meaning that the author has been developing since his 1975 book, The Language of Thought. Among philosophers, a general consensus exists that a referential semantics for mental representation cannot support a robust account of intentional explanation. This book is largely a reconsideration of the arguments that are supposed to ground this consensus. Fodor offers a theory sketch in which psychological explanation is intentional, psychological processes are computational, and the semantic properties of mental representations are referential.</p>
},
	keywords = {Content (Psychology), Intentionalism, Intentionality (Philosophy)., Psycholinguistics},
	isbn = {0262560933},
	url = {http://lccn.loc.gov/94006403},
	author = {Fodor, Jerry A.}
}
