| Anonymous | |
|---|---|
| Log in for more site access. | |
 | |
Intentional Deception
Certainty Style Key
Hover over keys for definitions:
True
Likely
Speculative
Human Uniqueness Compared to "Great Apes":
Relative DifferenceMOCA Domain:
BehaviorHumans intentionally deceive each other as to their thoughts and intentions. Nearly all societies have both sanctioned and unacceptable forms of deception. The ability of great apes to intentionally deceive one another is not well defined. Some propose that apes do intentionally deceive each other (specifically captive chimpanzees with regard to the localization of desirable food or objects), while others feel that deception is solely a human trait. Chimpanzees have so far not been shown to be able to hold false beliefs.
Deception occurs ubiquitously among organisms (including viruses, bacteria, plants, and animals) and facilitates feeding, mating, threat evasion, and other advantages (Trivers 2011). Intentional (or tactical) deception is more specific, and may be defined as the purposeful presentation of false information in order to manipulate others and gain an advantage (Byrne, Whiten 1992). Deception is universally recognized among human societies, many of whom directly address the issue of deception using ethical and/or legal frameworks. Rules against deception like tax evasion or counterfeiting are designed to prevent cheating behavior that undermines social stability. Although intentional deception appears to be present in the great apes, there is significant debate about whether such behavior employs theory of mind.
The Human Difference:
Recorded evidence for human deception far exceeds the case reports for other great apes. In frequency, scope, and sophistication of deception, we appear to be unrivaled as a species. Our ability to purposefully manipulate another’s mental state may be specific to our species. Nonetheless, efforts to identify cognitive prerequisites and examples of deception in captive and wild great ape communities continue. Based on current evidence, intentional deception appears widely among primates and differs fundamentally from camouflaging behavior exhibited by other taxa. The distinction between deception in humans and other primates remains controversial. Intentional deception is often cited as evidence for theory of mind among the great apes. In short, successful intentional deception provides evidence that an animal recognizes and manipulates consciousness/mental states in others (Premack and Woodruff 1978). Recently, Daniel Povinelli has challenged the relevance of these experiments, arguing that intentional deception requires behavioral abstraction, but not reasoning from mental states. In other words, primates may learn how their behavior affects the behavior of others without recognizing that another mind is involved. Citing experiments using blindfolded handlers, Povinelli observes that chimpanzees employ food-begging behavior regardless of whether the handler can see them or not. Povinelli argues that reasoning about another’s mental state is a unique, human development that is built on top of the basic primate model of predictive behavioral abstraction. If this is the case, then experiments that use primate behavior as evidence for theory of mind engage in “folk psychology.” In these studies, researchers fallaciously assume that primates engage in behavioral responses because they use the same mental reasoning that we employ (Povinelli, 2003).
Universality in Human Populations:
Human Universal: Whether active deception for tangible benefit, concealment of feelings, or self-deception, all humans appear to engage in some level of intentional deception that works on an understanding of behavior and mental status in others.
Possible Selection Processes Responsible for the Difference:
Humans experience sophisticated, reciprocal self-awareness that builds on top of primate behavioral abstraction. This awareness may place increased demand for self-deception on the human brain. The benefit of successful deception can be weighed against the cost of increased cognitive load, and individuals with exceptional unconscious/self-deceptive abilities may have enjoyed a significant benefit in resource acquisition, mating, and coping with manifest adversities.
Implications for Understanding Modern Humans:
As a species that may depend on self-deception for functionality in the face of perceived mortality, we may find that psychiatric illness, criminality, and treachery finds root in a species specific coping mechanism for the burden of awareness. Intentional deception in the context of confirmed theory of mind may make humans an ideal model for studying the function of deception in living primates. In turn, these studies may allow us to determine how the solace and advantages provided by deception stack against societal instability that results.
Occurrence in Other Animals:
Using studies conducted on captive chimpanzees at Arnhem, Frans de Waal concluded that primates utilize intentional deception, concealing true conditions and projecting false images. He argues that, in animals that learn the effects of communication, voluntary signal production can lead to social manipulation for one’s benefit. Krebs, Dawkins, and Smith debate whether communication emerged from attempts to manipulate others or cooperate. Regardless, the short-term advantage to the individual must be balanced against long-term group stability. In essence, once deception predominates, communication becomes impossible. While many types of animals possess “species-typical” behaviors that camouflage their condition, de Waal argues that intentional deception that comes from an understanding of signal meaning should display much greater diversity (de Waal, 1992). For example, false injury display among ground-nesting birds was described by Swarth, Grimes, and Allen in 1935-1936. The behavior is attributed to efforts to decoy predators away from vulnerable nests. De Waal argues that intended deception requires much more sophisticated cognition, including a sense of self, an understanding of signal meaning to others, and the motivation to manipulate. Menzel’s work in the 1970’s appears to elucidate these elements in chimpanzees. In a series of experiments, Menzel observed that subordinate chimpanzees with knowledge about food location will lead other subordinates to the cache, but lead the group away when a dominant male is present. (Menzel, 1974). The experiments appear to demonstrate intentionality, manipulation, and flexibility that are consistent with purposeful deception. Efforts to quantify episodes of deception by Byrne and Whiten reveals species-specific differences, with chimpanzees engaging in frequent intentional deception relative to other great apes like gorillas. Surprisingly, strepsirhines do not appear to engage in such behavior at all (Byne and Whiten, 1992). Research continues, and recent work by Wheeler identifies the use of false predator warning calls by capuchins in order to secure more food than other group members.
References:
- De Waal, Frans. Intentional Deception in Primates. Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews. Volume 1, Issue 3, pages 86–92, 1992e Harry S. Swarth. Injury-Feigning in Nesting Birds. The Auk , Vol. 52, No. 3 (Jul., 1935), pp. 352-354
- Menzel EW. A group of young chimpanzees in a one-acre field: Leadership and communication. In Schrier A, Stollnitz F (eds), Behavior of Nonhuman Primates (83-153). New York Academic Press, 1974.
- R. W. Byrne and A. Whiten. Cognitive Evolution in Primates: Evidence from Tactical Deception. Man, New Series, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 609-627
- Brandon C. Wheeler. Monkeys crying wolf? Tufted capuchin monkeys use anti-predator calls to usurp resources from conspecifics Proc. R. Soc. B (2009) 276, 3013–3018
- Robert Trivers. The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and Self-Deception in Human Life. New York: Basic Books, 2011.
- David Premack and Guy Woodruff. Does the Chimpanzee have a theory of mind? The Behavioral and Brain Sciences (1978), 4: 515-526.
- Povinelli, Daniel J. and Jennifer Vonk. Chimpanzee minds: suspiciously human? TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences. 2003: 7(4) 157-160.